Probabilistic nondeterministic processes are commonly modeled as probabilistic LTSs (PLTSs). A number of logical characterizations of the main behavioral relations on PLTSs have been studied. In particular, Parma and Segala [2007] and Hermanns et al. [2011] define a probabilistic Hennessy-Milner logic interpreted over probability distributions, whose corresponding logical equivalence/preorder when restricted to Dirac distributions coincides with standard bisimulation/simulation between the states of a PLTS. This result is here extended by studying the full logical equivalence/preorder between (possibly non-Dirac) distributions in terms of a notion of bisimulation/simulation defined on an LTS whose states are distributions (dLTS). We show that the well-known spectrum of behavioral relations on nonprobabilistic LTSs as well as their corresponding logical characterizations in terms of Hennessy-Milner logic scales to the probabilistic setting when considering dLTSs. 
INTRODUCTION
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A number of behavioral relations and temporal logics tailored for probabilistic systems have been put forward (see, e.g., Deng and van Glabbeek [2010] , van Glabbeek et al. [1990] , Hansson and Jonsson [1994] , Hennessy [2012] , Hermanns et al. [2011] , Larsen and Skou [1991] , Parma and Segala [2007] , and Segala and Lynch [1995] ). Probabilistic LTSs (PLTSs, a.k.a. probabilistic automata) are a prominent model for formalizing probabilistic systems since they allow one to model both probabilistic and nondeterministic behaviors. In PLTSs, a state s evolves through a labeled transition to a probability distribution over states that define the probabilities of reaching the possible successor states of s. Accordingly, the standard probabilistic extension [Segala and Lynch 1995] of the simulation relation requires that if a state s progresses to a distribution d, then a simulating state s needs to mimic such a transition by moving to a distribution d that is related to d through a so-called weight function. This definition is a conservative extension of the simulation relation on nonprobabilistic LTSs since an LTS can be viewed as a particular PLTS where the targets of transitions are the so-called Dirac distributions, that is, state distributions δ s such that δ s (s) = 1 and δ s (t) = 0 for any t = s.
Several modal logics have been proposed in order to provide a logical characterization of probabilistic simulation and bisimulation. The logic of Larsen and Skou [1991] as well as the PCTL logic of Hansson and Jonsson [1994] are interpreted over states of probabilistic systems that do not express nondeterminism such as reactive models and discrete-time Markov chains. On the other hand, Parma and Segala [2007] show that richer probabilistic models that encode pure nondeterminism (besides probabilistic choice), such as PLTSs, call for a richer logic. They therefore suggest a probabilistic extension of HML whose formulae are interpreted over state distributions rather than states, and they show that two states s and t are bisimilar if and only if their corresponding Dirac distributions δ s and δ t satisfy the same set of formulae. However, nothing is stated by Parma and Segala [2007] about logically equivalent distributions that are not Dirac distributions. The logical characterizations by Parma and Segala [2007] have been later extended by Hermanns et al. [2011] to simulation relations and to image-infinite PLTSs.
In this article, we study the full logical equivalence between (possibly non-Dirac) distributions that is induced by the logic of Parma and Segala [2007] . We show that this logic actually characterizes a novel and natural notion of simulation (bisimulation) between distributions of a PLTS, so that the standard state simulation (bisimulation) on PLTSs can be indeed retrieved by a suitable restriction to Dirac distributions. Furthermore, the transition relation of a PLTS is lifted to a transition relation between distributions that gives rise to a corresponding LTS on distributions, called dLTS. This allows us to lift behavioral relations on PLTSs to corresponding behavioral relations on dLTSs. Such a move from PLTSs to dLTSs provides the following advantages:
-The logic of Parma and Segala [2007] turns out to be equivalent to a logic L whose diamond predecessor operator is interpreted on the dLTS in accordance with the standard semantics on LTSs. In this regard, this logic best suits as a probabilistic extension of Hennessy-Milner logic. In particular, L characterizes a (bi)simulation relation between (possibly non-Dirac) distributions, which is equivalent to that characterized by Parma and Segala's logic. -A spectrum of behavioral relations can be defined on dLTSs along the lines of the well-known approach on LTSs [van Glabbeek et al. 1990 ]. These preorder/equivalence relations between distributions can then be projected back to states, thus providing a spectrum of (probabilistic) preorder/equivalence relations between states of PLTSs.
This approach is studied on a number of well-known probabilistic relations appearing in the literature, namely, simulation, probabilistic simulation, failure simulation, and their corresponding bisimulations. A discussion about related approaches is the subject of the final section, which also hints at future work. This is an extended and revised version of the conference paper [Crafa and Ranzato 2011b] .
SIMULATION AND BISIMULATION ON PROBABILISTIC LTSS

Basic Notions
Given a set X and a relation R ⊆ X× X, we write x Ry for (x, y)
Let R ⊆ X × X be a preorder on X, namely, a reflexive and transitive relation. We denote by K R the kernel of R, namely, the largest equivalence relation contained in R,
there exists a family of equivalence classes {C i } i∈I of the kernel K R such that U = ∪ i∈I C i = ∪ i∈I R(C i ); and (3) a R-closed set U is finitely generated if there exists a finite set of equivalence classes
Distr(X) denotes the set of (stochastic) distributions on a set X, that is, the set of
. The Dirac distribution on x ∈ X, denoted by δ x , is the distribution that assigns probability 1 to x (and 0 otherwise).
A probabilistic LTS (PLTS) is a tuple M = , Act, → , where is a countable set of states, Act is a countable set of actions, and → ⊆ × Act × Distr( ) is a countable transition relation, where (s, a, d) ∈ → is denoted by s a → d. For any action a ∈ Act, the predecessor operator pre a : ℘(Distr( )) → ℘( ) is defined by pre a (D) {s ∈ | ∃d ∈ D.s a →d}, while the successor operator post a : ℘( ) → ℘(Distr( )) is defined as post a (S) {d ∈ Distr( ) | ∃s ∈ S. s a →d}. M is image-finite when for any state s and action a, post a ({s}) is a finite set.
Lifting Relations
The definitions of probabilistic behavioral relations often rely on so-called weight functions [Segala 1995] that are used to lift a relation between states to a relation between distributions. For our purposes, we do not need to recall the definition of weight function as we will use the following equivalent characterizations (see Desharnais [1999] , Hermanns et al. [2011 ], Zhang [2008 , and Zhang et al. [2008] ), where condition (3) is proved by Hermanns et al. [2011, Lemma 5.2] .
Definition 2.1 (Lifting). Let R ⊆ X × X be a relation on a set X. Then, the lifting of R to distributions is the relation R ⊆ Distr(X) × Distr(X) defined as follows:
If R is a preorder, then
It is easy to see that if R ⊆ R , then R ⊆ R . Moreover, if R is symmetric, then R is also a symmetric relation, which we also denote with ≡ R . When R is an equivalence relation on X, it turns out that d R e iff d(B) = e(B) for any equivalence class B of R (see, e.g., Hermanns et al. [2011, Lemma 3.2] ). The following easy properties of the lifting relation will be useful later on. LEMMA 2.2. Let d, e ∈ Distr( ) and R ⊆ × . If d R e, then
(1) for any x ∈ supp(d), there exists y ∈ supp(e) such that y ∈ R(x); (2) for any y ∈ supp(e), there exists x ∈ supp(d) such that y ∈ R(x).
PROOF. For property (1), notice that if d R e, then we have that for any x ∈ supp(d), 0 < d(x) ≤ e(R(x)), which implies that there exists y ∈ supp(e) such that y ∈ R(x). As far as property (2) 
; that is, for any y ∈ supp(e), there exists x ∈ supp(d) such that y ∈ R(x).
We also notice that any relation on distributions R ⊆ Distr( ) × Distr( ) embeds a corresponding relation on states that can be obtained by restricting R to Dirac distributions. This is formalized by a mapping :
Note that if R is a symmetric/preorder/equivalence relation on Distr( ), then (R) is correspondingly a symmetric/preorder/equivalence relation on . Also, it is easy to notice that if R ⊆ R, then (R ) ⊆ (R) , and if R, R are equivalences, then
Simulation and Bisimulation
The standard notions of simulation and bisimulation on PLTSs (dating back to Larsen and Skou [1991] ) go as follows. We define R sim ∪{R ⊆ × | R is a simulation on M}. It is easily seen that R sim turns out to be a preorder relation, which is the greatest simulation on M and is called simulation preorder (or similarity) on M. Simulation equivalence P sim on M is defined as the kernel of the simulation preorder, that is, Let us define P bis ∪{S ⊆ × | S is a bisimulation on M}. Then, P bis turns out to be an equivalence relation, which is the greatest bisimulation on M and is called bisimilarity on M.
Definition 2.3 (Simulation). Given a PLTS
M = , Act, → , a relation R ⊆ × is a simulation on M ifP sim R sim ∩ R −1 sim . Definition 2.4 (Bisimulation). A symmetric relation S ⊆ × is a bisimulation on M if for all s, t ∈ such that sSt,
A NEW NOTION OF SIMULATION
In order to provide a modal logical characterization of the basic behavioral relations on probabilistic models that also encode pure nondeterminism, such as PLTSs, Parma and Segala [2007] put forward an extension of Hennessy-Milner logic whose formulae are interpreted over distributions on the states of a PLTS. In particular, they show that two states s 1 and s 2 are bisimilar if and only if their corresponding Dirac distributions δ s 1 and δ s 2 satisfy the same set of modal formulae. Successively, this logical characterization has been extended to the simulation relation by Hermanns et al. [2011] . However, nothing is stated by Hermanns et al. [2011] and Parma and Segala [2007] about distributions that turn out to be logically equivalent although they are not Dirac distributions. In the following, we give a novel notion of simulation (and correspondingly bisimulation) between distributions that (1) characterizes the full logical equivalence of the logic of Parma and Segala [2007] between possibly non-Dirac distributions and (2) boils down to standard simulation (and bisimulation) between the states of a PLTS when restricted to Dirac distributions.
Parma and Segala's Logic
The logic of Parma and Segala [2007] , here denoted by L ∀ , is syntactically defined as follows:
where I is a (possibly infinite) countable set of indices, a ∈ Act and p is a rational number in [0, 1] . Given a PLTS , Act, → , the notion of a distribution satisfying a logical formula is inductively defined as follows: for any distribution d ∈ Distr( ),
The first three clauses are standard. The modal connective 3 a is a probabilistic counterpart of HML's diamond operator: 3 a φ is satisfied by a distribution d whenever any state x ∈ supp(d) reaches through an a-labeled transition a distribution e that satisfies the formula φ. As the formulae 3 a φ only deal with transitions of the PLTS, a further modal operator [·] p is needed to take into account the probabilities that distributions assign to sets of states. More precisely, a distribution d satisfies a formula [φ] p when d assigns a probability of at least p to the set of states whose Dirac distributions satisfy the formula φ. This logic is here referred to as L ∀ in order to stress the universal flavor of the semantics of its diamond operator 3 a . Given a distribution d, we will use the following notation:
Definition 3.1 (Logical equivalence and preorder).
Let L + ∀ be the positive (i.e., negation-free) and finitely disjunctive (i.e., only finite disjunctions are allowed) fragment of L ∀ , that is:
The following result by Parma and Segala [2007, Theorem 1] and Hermanns et al. [2011, Theorems 5.3 and 6.1] Let us remark that the previous logical characterization for simulation R sim holds for the positive restriction of the logic L ∀ to finite rather than infinite disjunctions of formulae. This comes as a consequence of the characterization of weight functions in Definition 2.1 (3), proved by Hermanns et al. [2011, Lemma 5.2] .
In what follows, our goal is to define a notion of simulation and bisimulation between distributions that allows us to extend Theorem 3.2 to generic (viz. possibly non-Dirac) distributions in order to encode the full operational match of the logical preorder ≤ L + ∀ and equivalence ≡ L ∀ .
∀d-Simulations
We observe that the semantics of the diamond operator of Parma and Segala's logic highlights a key difference with the semantics of the standard diamond operator in Hennessy-Milner logic HML. In the case of standard LTSs, the semantics of the diamond operator of HML induces the predecessor operator pre LTS a of the LTS, meaning that the standard predecessor operator pre 
If pre a : ℘(Distr( )) → ℘( ) denotes the PLTS predecessor operator, then we have that
). These observations lead us to define the probabilistic predecessor operator ppre
However, one key point to observe is that, differently from the standard predecessor operator pre LTS a of LTSs, this probabilistic predecessor ppre ∀ a does not preserve set unions; that is, it is not true in general that, for any
It is also worth noting that, in general, an operator f : ℘(X) → ℘(X) defined on a powerset ℘(X) preserves set unions if and only if there exists a relation R ⊆ X × X whose corresponding predecessor operator pre R = λY.{x ∈ X | ∃y ∈ Y. x Ry} coincides with f . As a consequence, one cannot define a transition relation between distributions of the PLTS whose corresponding predecessor operator coincides with ppre ∀ a . In logical terms, the previous remark reads as lack of distributity of the diamond connective 3 a w.r.t. logical disjunction in Parma and Segala's logic L ∀ . Example 3.3. Consider the PLTS
It is worth remarking that distributivity w.r.t. logical disjunction of a diamond connective modeling the "possibly" modality holds already in the weakest modal logic K and therefore should be a basic desirable property for any modal logic that characterizes simulation and bisimulation in probabilistic systems.
A first definition of simulation (and bisimulation) between distributions, which we call ∀d-simulation, is directly inspired by the logic L ∀ and the probabilistic predecessor ppre ∀ a . In particular, the two distinctive modal operators of L ∀ are mirrored in two defining conditions of simulation between distributions. More precisely, condition (1) of the next definitions encodes a kind of universal transfer property-directly derived from the semantics of the diamond operator in L ∀ -that similar/bisimilar distributions should respect. On the other hand, condition (2), peculiar to the probabilistic setting, deals with the probabilities assigned by similar/bisimilar distributions to sets of related states. Let M = , Act, → be a PLTS.
Given a PLTS M, we define: PROOF. It is straightforward to check that R ∀ sim is a preorder. We prove that it is a ∀d-simulation, which implies that it is the greatest one. Assume that d R ∀ sim e. Hence, there exists a ∀d-simulation R such that d R e. Therefore, we have that d (R) e, which implies d
The proof for ∀d-bisimulation follows the same lines. 2 Therefore, we call R ∀ sim the ∀d-simulation preorder on M, while P ∀ bis is called the ∀d-bisimilarity on M. It turns out that these notions allow us to fulfill our goal of extending Theorem 3.2 to generic distributions. In fact, we have that the ∀d-simulation preorder fully captures the logical preorder induced by L + ∀ while ∀d-bisimilarity fully captures the logical equivalence induced by L ∀ . THEOREM 3.7. For any d, e ∈ Distr( ),
We proceed by structural induction on φ.
-The cases φ = , i∈I φ i , φ 1 ∨ φ 2 are straightforward.
e and let us show that d R ∀ sim e. It is sufficient to prove that the relation
is a ∀d-simulation, since this implies Q ⊆ R ∀ sim . First, we observe that Q is a preorder. We first prove the condition (2) of ∀d-simulation, namely, if (d, e) ∈ Q then d (Q) e. Since (Q) is a preorder, by using Definition 2.1 (3), we show that for any U = (Q)(U ) that is finitely generated, we have that
} j∈J be an enumeration of the equivalence classes of the kernel K (Q) of the preorder (Q), where
Since U is finitely generated, we know that U = ∪ i∈F [s i ] for some finite subset F ⊆ I of indices of equivalence classes in {[s i ]} i∈I , and observe
. We thus define ψ U i∈F φ i and we observe that since ψ U is a finite disjunction of formulae in L
Let us now prove condition (1) of ∀d-simulation. Let (d, e) ∈ Q and supp(d) ⊆ pre a (D) for some D ⊆ Distr( ) and suppose, by contradiction, that supp(e) ⊆ pre a (Q(D)). Hence, there exists y ∈ supp(e) such that y / ∈ pre a (Q(D)). By condition (2) of ∀d-simulation already shown earlier, we have that d (Q) e. Thus, for y ∈ supp(e), by Lemma 2.2 (2), there exists
; otherwise, we would have that g ∈ Q(D) and therefore we would get the contradiction y ∈ pre a (Q(D)). Thus, for any g ∈ Distr( ) such that y
and g |= ψ f,g . We consider the formula
Let us now prove (2). (⇒) Assume that d P ∀ bis e and let us prove that for all φ ∈ L ∀ , d |= φ iff e |= φ. We proceed by structural induction on φ.
-The cases φ = , ¬φ 1 , i∈I φ i are immediate. 
Similarly to the case of simulation, it is enough to show that the relation
is a ∀d-bisimulation. We first observe that R is an equivalence relation. Analogously to the case of simulation, the first condition of ∀d-bisimulation is shown by contradiction.
Since L ∀ is closed under negation, this implies that there exists φ h, f ∈ L ∀ such that f |= φ h, f and h |= φ h, f . We thus consider the formula
(note that post a (y) = ∅), which is in L ∀ and, by construction, is such that d |= 3 a φ y and e |= 3 a φ y , namely, which is a contradiction to Sat
It is left to prove that if (d, e) ∈ R, then d ≡ (R) e. As R is an equivalence relation, (R) is an equivalence relation. Hence, given a block B of (R), we have to show that d(B) = e(B). Let {[s j ]} j∈J be an enumeration of the equivalence classes of the equivalence relation (R), where
d-Simulations
Consider the transfer property of a ∀d-simulation R, namely, condition (1) of Definition 3.4: using the definition of ppre ∀ a , this can be equivalently stated as
Since ppre does not scale to the standard transfer property of simulations on LTSs. As a consequence, while the transfer property that characterizes simulations on LTSs admits a natural game characterization [Nielsen and Clausen 1994] (since predecessor operators in LTSs are additive), it is not clear whether a game-based characterization can also be given for simulations on PLTSs. It is therefore interesting to ask whether a suitable definition of an additive (i.e., preserving arbitrary set unions) probabilistic predecessor operator between distributions can be given.
Let us therefore consider the following alternative definition of probabilistic predecessor operator:
Hence, this definition corresponds to the existential version of the ppre ∀ a operator: in order for a distribution d to be a probabilistic predecessor of a distribution e, it is now sufficient that the support of d contains some state that reaches e. In this sense, ppre a has an existential flavor as opposed to the universal flavor of ppre ∀ a . We will make this observation precise in Section 6 through a formalization in the standard abstract interpretation framework Cousot 1977, 1979] .
The previous ppre a operator clearly preserves arbitrary set unions, so that a corresponding transition relation between distributions can be defined as follows:
This allows us to lift a PLTS to an LTS of distributions, which we call dLTS (distributionbased LTS). Accordingly, the following notions of simulation/bisimulation based on the standard transfer property in LTSs naturally arise.
It turns out that ∀d-(bi)simulations and d-(bi)simulations are equivalent notions. In spite of the fact that they rely on rather different transfer properties, their second defining condition, peculiar to the probabilistic setting, is powerful enough to bridge this gap. More precisely, the following proof shows that this depends on the easy properties of the lifting relation R stated in Lemma 2.2. 
, for some D ⊆ Distr( ), and y ∈ supp(e), then y ∈ pre a (R(D)). From d R e, we have that d (R) e so that for y ∈ supp(e), by Lemma 2.2 (2), there exists
The proof for bisimulation is similar. 2
We define Let us turn to (2). We first show that 
The proofs for (2) involving bisimulations are similar. 2 Example 3.13. Consider the leftmost PLTS depicted in Figure 1 . Observe that the relation
→δ v while the only b-transition departing from e 1 is e 1 b →δ u and δ u / ∈ R 1 (δ v ). On the other hand, consider the equivalence relation R 2 on distributions whose corresponding partition includes the following blocks of equivalent distributions:
It is easy to check that R 2 is a dbisimulation: we have that every pair of distributions in R 2 respects the transfer property of d-bisimulation and is ≡ (R 2 ) -equivalent. Hence, δ s 1 and δ t 1 are d-bisimilar, and therefore, by Theorem 3.12 (1), s 1 and t 1 are similar states, and the non-Dirac distributions d 1 and e 1 result to be d-bisimilar.
Consider now the rightmost PLTS in Figure 1 . Here, we have that s 2 simulates t 2 but t 2 does not simulate s 2 , while the distribution d 2 d-simulates e 2 . In fact, consider the following relation between distributions:
Then, R 3 is a d-simulation, since every pair of distributions in R 3 respects the transfer property of d-simulation and belongs to (R 3 ) . For instance, let us check that e 2 (R 3 ) d 2 : by Definition 2.1, it is enough to check that for all U ⊆ supp(e 2 ), e 2 (U ) ≤ d 2 ( (R 3 )(U )). The nonempty subsets of supp(e 2 ) are: U 1 = {x 3 }, U 2 = {x 4 } and U 3 = {x 3 , x 4 }, so that we have
The fact that t 2 does not simulate s 2 can be retrieved by the fact that e 2 does not dsimulate d 2 . In fact, by Theorem 3.12 (1), if t 2 simulates s 2 , then δ t 2 d-simulates δ s 2 , and this would imply that there exists a d-simulation R such that d 2 (R) e 2 . However, this latter condition implies that for {x 1 , x 2 } = supp(d 2 ), 1 = d 2 ({x 1 , x 2 }) ≤ e 2 ( (R)({x 1 , x 2 })), which can be true only if supp(e 2 ) = {x 3 , x 4 } ⊆ (R)({x 1 , x 2 }). Hence, in particular, we would obtain δ x 4 ∈ R({δ x 1 , δ x 2 }), which is a contradiction since δ x 4 cannot d-simulate a b-transition.
A NEW LOGIC FOR SIMULATION
Besides the previous notions of d-simulation/d-bisimulation, the additive operator ppre a allows us to provide a corresponding new interpretation for the diamond connective. Let us denote simply by L the logic whose syntax coincides with L ∀ and whose semantics is identical to that of L ∀ but for the diamond connective 3 a , which is interpreted as follows:
This is therefore the standard modal interpretation of the diamond connective on a dLTS, namely, an LTS whose "states" are distributions and whose transitions a → between distributions are defined by condition ( * ) in Section 3.2. Observe that this interpretation of 3 a inhibits the simple counterexample in Example 3.3.
We denote by L + the positive and finitely disjunctive fragment of L. It turns out that the preorder ≤ L + and the equivalence ≡ L logically characterize, respectively, the d-simulation preorder and d-bisimulation equivalence. 
is a d-simulation. Let us observe that Q is trivially a preorder. Let us prove by contra- 
It remains, then, to prove that if (d, e) ∈ Q, then d (Q) e. Since (Q) is a preorder, by using Definition 2.1 (3), we show that for any U = (Q)(U ) that is finitely generated, we have that d(U ) ≤ e(U ). This part of the proof follows the same lines of the analogous part of the proof of Theorem 3.7 (1) and is therefore omitted.
Let us now show (2). 
is a d-bisimulation. We first note that R is an equivalence relation. Let us prove the first condition of d-bisimulation by contradiction. Let (d, e) ∈ R, d a → f , and for all g ∈ Distr( ) such that e a → g, by contradiction assume that g ∈ R( f ); that is, there exists
Since L is closed under negation, we have that there exists a formula ψ f,g ∈ L such that f |= ψ f,g and g |= ψ f,g . We thus consider the formula ψ f {ψ f,g | g ∈ Distr( ), e a → g}, which is in L. Then, by construction, it turns out that d |= 3 a ψ, whereas e |= 3 a ψ, which is a contradiction to Sat
It is left to prove that if (d, e) ∈ R, then d ≡ (R) e. This part of the proof follows the same lines of the analogous part of the proof of Theorem 3.7 (2) and is therefore omitted.
COMPARING LOGICS
As a straight consequence of Theorem 3.7, Lemma 3.10, and Theorem 4.1, it turns out that the logical preorders and equivalences induced, respectively, by the positive logics L + ∀ and L + and by the full logics L ∀ and L coincide.
Let us now compare these logics w.r.t. their expressive powers. Given a generic logic L, which is interpreted over a PLTS M = , Act, → , the semantics of
In the following, we show that the full logics L and L ∀ have the same expressive power, while, for their positive and finitely disjunctive fragments, we show that L + is strictly more expressive than L + ∀ . To this purpose, we consider two encoding maps· :
which are inductively defined as follows: 
PROOF. Let us prove (1). We show that
It is worth observing that this equivalence of expressiveness between L ∀ and L depends on the fact that the semantics of the "universal" diamond connective of L ∀ can be encoded in L that instead features an "existential" diamond connective and vice versa. In particular, the L ∀ semantics of a diamond formula
On the other hand, the encoding of a diamond formula in L as a formula in L ∀ is more tricky. The L-semantics of 3 a φ is given by all the distributions whose support contains at least a state that may move to a distribution that satisfies φ, that is, 
, because this set of semantics is closed under applications of infinite intersections, finite unions, probabilistic predecessor, and the semantics of the operator [·] p . It is thus enough to observe that Distr( ) \ {δ
. Actually, we also note that Distr( ) \ {δ x 2 } can only be expressed as the infinite union Example 5.5. Consider again the rightmost PLTS in Figure 1 . We have already observed in Example 3.13 that s 2 simulates t 2 while t 2 does not simulate s 2 . The fact that t 2 does not simulate s 2 can be easily proved by exhibiting a formula that is satisfied by δ s 2 but not by δ t 2 . We provide both a formula in L + ∀ and an equivalent formula in L + obtained through the encoding· of Lemma 5.2:
. On the other hand, supp(δ t 2 ) ⊆ pre a ({e 2 }), but there is no distribution f such that ( f |= L + ∀ and) supp(e 2 ) ⊆ pre b ({ f }), because x 4 ∈ supp(e 2 ) has no outgoing transition.
In order to check (2), notice that δ s 2 |= L + φ since δ s 2 a →d 2 , and
STATES AS ABSTRACT INTERPRETATION OF DISTRIBUTIONS
Unlike LTSs and their standard behavioral relations, whose definitions rely on a single notion of system state, PLTSs as well as the corresponding notions of simulation/ bisimulation involve two notions of system state, namely, a bare state and a probabilistic state modeled as a state distribution. We have shown earlier how PLTSs can be embedded into dLTSs, that is, LTSs of probabilistic states that involve a single (but richer) notion of system state (i.e., state distributions). We show in this section how to formalize a systematic embedding of states into distributions by viewing states as abstractions of distributions. The intuition is that Dirac distributions allow us to view states as an abstraction of distributions, namely, the map δ : → Distr( ) such that δ(x) δ x can be viewed as a function that embeds states into distributions. The other way around, the support map supp : Distr( ) → ℘( ) can be viewed as a function that abstracts a distribution d to the set of states in the support of d.
Let us recall that in the standard abstract interpretation framework for specifying sound approximations of system models [Cousot and Cousot 1977 , 1979 , 1992 , approximations of a concrete semantic domain are encoded by abstract domains that are specified by Galois insertions (GIs for short) or, equivalently, by adjunctions. The notion of approximation on a concrete/abstract domain is encoded by a partial order ≤ where, traditionally, x ≤ y means that y is a sound approximation of x. Concrete and abstract approximation orders, denoted by ≤ C and ≤ A , must be related by a GI. Let us recall that a GI of an abstract domain A, ≤ A into a concrete domain C, ≤ C is determined by a surjective abstraction map α : C → A and a one-to-one concretization map γ : A → C such that α(c) ≤ A a ⇔ c ≤ C γ (a) and is here denoted by (α, C, A, γ ) . In a GI, α(c) intuitively provides the best approximation in A of a concrete value c, while γ (a) is the concrete value that a abstractly represents.
In our case, in order to cast δ as a concretization map in abstract interpretation, we need to lift its definition to powersets; namely, we need to provide its so-called "collecting" version [Cousot and Cousot 1977 , 1979 , 1992 . First, we observe that {δ(x)} = {d ∈ Distr( ) | supp(d) ⊆ {x}}. Hence, this leads us to define the following concretization function γ
This is a universal concretization function, meaning that d ∈ γ ∀ (S) if and only if all the states in supp(d) are contained in S. One can dually define an existential concretization map γ
where d ∈ γ ∃ (S) if there exists some state in the support of d, which is contained in S. Actually, these two mappings give rise to a pair of GIs (i.e., sound approximations as formalized in abstract interpretation) where ℘(Distr( )) and ℘( ) play, respectively, the role of concrete and abstract domains. The approximation order is encoded by the subset relation (i.e., logical implication) in the case of γ ∀ and by the superset relation (i.e., logical coimplication) in the case of γ ∃ . The dual maps, systematically obtained by adjunction from γ ∀ and γ ∃ , are α ∀ , α ∃ : ℘(Distr( )) → ℘( ) defined as follows:
PROOF. Given X ∈ ℘(Distr( )) and S ∈ ℘( ), we have that
As observed in the previous proof, α ∀ /γ ∀ and α ∃ /γ ∃ are dual abstractions, that is,
Moreover, it is not hard to see that α ∀ is the additive extension of the supp function, while α ∃ is its coadditive extension, that is,
These two abstract domains thus provide dual universal/existential ways for logically approximating sets of distributions into sets of states. One interesting point in these formal abstractions lies in the fact that they allow us to systematically obtain the previous probabilistic predecessor operators ppre ∀ a and ppre a in a dLTS from the predecessor operator pre a of the corresponding PLTS. Recall that in a PLTS, the predecessor operator pre a : ℘(Distr( )) → ℘( ) maps a set of distributions into a set of states. Here, ℘( ) can therefore be viewed as a universal/existential abstraction of ℘(Distr( )), so that, correspondingly, pre a can be viewed as an abstract predecessor function, since its codomain actually is an abstract domain. Consequently, the output of this abstract function can be projected back to distributions using the corresponding concretization map. Interestingly, it turns out that the corresponding concrete predecessor functions, obtained by composing the operator pre a with either γ ∀ or γ ∃ , exactly coincide with the two probabilistic predecessors ppre 
A SPECTRUM OF PROBABILISTIC RELATIONS OVER DLTSS
The approach developed previously advocates for a general methodology for defining behavioral relations between states of a PLTS: first define a "lifted" behavioral relation between distributions of the corresponding dLTS and then restrict this definition to Dirac distributions. As discussed earlier, this approach works satisfactorily for simulation and bisimulation on PLTSs. In what follows, we show that this technique is indeed more general since it can be applied to a number of known behavioral relations on PLTSs. We focus only on the "simulation" version of these behavioral relations since the approach easily scales to the corresponding "bisimulation" counterparts. Segala [1995] and Segala and Lynch [1995] put forward a weaker variant of simulation where a state transition s a →d can be matched by a so-called combined transition from a state t, namely, a convex combination of distributions reachable from t. Probabilistic simulation originates from the intuition of interpreting nondeterministic choice in PLTSs as being based on schedulers. We show that the underlying idea of probabilistic simulation can be easily lifted to transitions in dLTSs.
Probabilistic Simulation
Let M = , Act, → be a PLTS, {s a →d i } i∈I a (countable) family of transitions in M, and { p i } i∈I a corresponding family of probabilities in [0, 1] 
Definition 7.1 (Probabilistic simulation [Segala and Lynch 1995] The greatest probabilistic simulation on M exists; it is a preorder relation called probabilistic simulation preorder (on M) and denoted by R psim .
Let us apply our approach in order to lift the previous notion of combined transition to distributions. Deng et al. [2008] , Hennessy [2012] , and Stoelinga [2002] . In particular, we observed that a hypertransition in the sense of Stoelinga [2002] , Deng et al. [2008] , and Hennessy [2012] is a hyper d-transition, but not vice versa. [Deng et al. 2008; Hennessy 2012; Stoelinga 2002] ). Let M = , Act, → be a PLTS.
-The hyper transition relation → h ⊆ Distr( ) × Act × Distr( ) by Deng et al. [2008, Section 4] 
Following the idea of probabilistic simulation in Definition 7.1, probabilistic dsimulation is defined following the pattern in Definition 3.8 for d-simulation, but using combined d-transitions rather than transitions in a dLTS. states. This is called strong probabilistic d-simulation [Hennessy 2012, Definition 3.16] and it is shown to capture the probabilistic extension of a standard notion of behavioral contextual equivalence. Let us denote here by R d spsim ⊆ Distr( ) × Distr( ) the corresponding preorder relation (while Hennessy [2012] deals with bisimulations, we focus here on simulations). It is not necessary to recall the full definition here, since we observe that Hennessy [2012, Proposition 3.13, Theorem 3.17] 
RELATED AND FUTURE WORK
Simulation and bisimulation on PLTSs have been introduced by Segala [1995] and Segala and Lynch [1995] as two behavioral relations that preserve significant classes of temporal properties in the probabilistic logic PCTL [Hansson and Jonsson 1994] . Since then, a number of works put forward probabilistic extensions of Hennessy-Milner logic in order to logically characterize these relations. Larsen and Skou [1991] and Desharnais et al. [2002] investigated a probabilistic diamond connective that enhances the diamond operator of HML with the probability bounds of transitions. However, these logics are adequate just for reactive and alternating systems, which are probabilistic models that are strictly less expressive than PLTSs. Two further probabilistic variants of HML are available [Deng et al. 2008; Parma and Segala 2007] . The first one has been defined by Parma and Segala [2007] (see also Hermanns et al. [2011] for simulation), whose formulae are interpreted on sets of probability distributions over the states of a PLTS. One distinctive connective of this logic is a modal operator [φ] p , whose semantics is the set of distributions that assign at least probability p to the set of states whose Dirac distributions satisfy φ. In this article, we have shown that such a logic admits an equivalent formulation that retains the probabilistic operator [φ] p and retrieves the diamond operator of HML by lifting it to distributions. Deng et al. [2008] and Hennessy [2012] follow a different approach. They propose a probabilistic variant of HML that is interpreted on sets of processes of the pCSP process calculus. In their logic, the semantics of the diamond operator is defined in terms of hyper transitions between distributions: this notion of hyper transition is more complex than ours and has been compared with our notion of hyper transition in Section 7. Moreover, the logic by Deng et al. [2008] and Hennessy [2012] features a probabilistic operator i∈I p i φ i that is satisfied by processes that correspond to distributions that can be decomposed into convex combinations of distributions that satisfy φ i . Besides (bi)simulation and probabilistic (bi)simulation, this logic is able to characterize two notions of failure and forward simulation that have been proved to agree with the testing preorders on pCSP processes (see Deng et al. [2008] and Hennessy [2012] ). The definition by Deng et al. [2008] of failure simulation is quite different from ours, which we directly derived from the standard LTS spectrum [van Glabbeek 2001] . One major difference is that we define a relation between states of a PLTS, which is then lifted to a relation between distributions, whereas Deng et al. [2008] consider a relation between states and distributions. A precise comparison between the spectrum of behavioral relations on dLTSs and the behavioral relations defined by Deng et al. [2008] is left as subject for future work. We also plan to investigate weak transitions in dLTSs that abstract from internal, invisible, actions. Weak variants of simulation, probabilistic simulation, and forward and failure simulation have been studied both by Deng et al. [2008] and by Parma and Segala [2007] .
As a further avenue of future work, we plan to study whether and how behavioral relations on PLTSs can be computed by resorting to standard algorithms for LTSs that compute the corresponding lifted relations on a dLTS. A first step in this direction has been taken by Ranzato [2011a, 2012] , where efficient algorithms to compute simulation and bisimulation on PLTSs have been derived by resorting to abstract interpretation techniques.
